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Abstract 
»Civil Society« is a concept that has been much discussed in relation to 
the processes of democratization in Southern Europe, Latin America and, 
especially, in Eastern Europe. Despite widespread recognition of its 
potential importance, scholars have not agreed on how to define it, nor are 
they sure what the specific nature of its contribution can be. 
This essay, is an attempt to pin down the meaning of civil society and the 
role that it can play in facilitating the consolidation of democracy. Emphasis 
is placed on four characteristics of intermediary organizations: their dual 
autonomy from both the state and primary social units of production and 
reproduction; their capacity collective action in defense of the interests and 
passions of their members; their limitation with regard to governing the 
polity as a whole; and, their willingness to act »civilly«, i.e. within pre-
established rules of exchange and influence. 
After exploring its relationship with social movements and political parties, 
attention is focused primarily on the emergent properties of individual 
interest associations and of the systems of interest intermediation they 
form. Hypothetically, it is suggested that variables such as the number of 
associations, their density of membership, the breadth of their respective 
domains and of their coverage of interests/passions, the extent of 
associational monopoly and the pressure of higher-order coordination 
mechanisms combine (admitted in a variety of ways) to determine the 
structural context within which these organizations can serve to link 
citizens and public authorities. Strategic capacity, encompassingness, 
class governance and congruence are offered as the key conditions which 
determine the strength or weakness of civil society.  
A series of hypotheses are proposed which link (positively and negatively) 
the relative strength of civil society to success or failure in the effort to 
consolidate democracy. 
Furthermore, it is argued that civil society is not an automatic or unreflexive 
product of capitalism, urbanization, literacy, social mobilization, economic 
growth – i.e. of development – although it is encouraged by all of the above. 
Rather, its emergence requires explicit policies by public authorities and 
implicit practices by private (re)producers. After a brief discussion of what 
these policies may be, the article concludes with some reflections of the 
changing international context and on the relevance of civil society in places 
and cultures far removed from its historic heartland: Western Europe. 
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Preface 
This paper was originally presented at the Conference on »Reconfiguring 
State and Society« at the University of California, Berkeley, on 22–23 April, 
1993. Although it was written in a hurry and lacks the usual protective 
apparatus of footnotes and references, I am pleased to offer it to the 
Political Science Series  of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the hope 
that it will contribute something to the lively, but still inconclusive debate 
about the importance of civil society for the consolidation of democracy in 
Eastern Europe. To my seminar students at the Institute and, especially, to 
Andreas Schedler, I would like to express my thanks for such a stimulating 
visit to Vienna. 
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I.  
The presence of a civil society (or, better said, of some degree, 
distribution or type of civil society) contributes positively to the 
consolidation (and, later, to the persistence) of democracy. 
1. Non-causality 
Civil society contributes to – but does not cause – the consolidation of 
democracy. It cannot unilaterally bring about democracy, or sustain 
democratic institutions and practices once they are in place. Ergo, civil 
society acts along with other institutions, processes and calculations in the 
democratic process. 
2. Civil Society 
»Civil society« (hereafter, CS) is here defined as a set or system of self-
organized intermediary groups: 
(1) that are relatively independent of both public authorities and private 
units of production and reproduction, i.e. of firms and families;  
(2) that are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions 
in defense/promotion of their interests/passions;  
(3) but do not seek to replace either state agents or private 
(re)producers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole;  
(4) but do agree to act within pre-established rules of a »civil« or legal 
nature. 
CS, therefore, rests on four conditions or norms:  
(1) dual autonomy;  
(2) collective action;  
(3) non-usurpation;  
(4) civility.  
These must be practiced within civil society by its intermediary units and 
respected by both public authorities and private (re)producers. The mere 
existence of intermediary organizations is necessary, but not sufficient 
evidence for the existence of a CS since these units can be manipulated by 
public or private actors and they can be mere facades masking actions by 
social groups intended to usurp power from legitimate state authorities or to 
exert domination over other social groups in »uncivil« ways. 
3. Consolidation of Democracy 
»Consolidation of democracy« (hereafter, CoD) could be defined as the 
process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and 
contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition from autocracy 
into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, 
regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by those persons or 
collectivities, i.e. politicians and citizens, that participate in democratic 
governance. If it sets in, the democratic regime will have institutionalized 
uncertainty in certain roles and policy areas, but it will also have reassured 
its citizens that the competition to occupy office and/or to exercise 
influence will be fair and circumscribed to a predictable range of outcomes. 
Modern, representative, political democracy rests on this »bounded 
uncertainty« and the »contingent consent« of actors to respect the 
outcomes it produces. 
The core of the consolidation dilemma, then, lies in coming up with a 
set of institutions that politicians can agree upon and citizens are willing to 
support. Arriving at a stable solution, especially in the climate of 
exaggerated expectations that tends to characterize the transition, is no 
easy matter. Not only are the choices intrinsically conflictual – with different 
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parties of politicians preferring rules that will ensure their own re-election or 
eventual access to power, and different groups of citizens wanting rules that 
will ensure greater accountability of their professional agents – but they are 
also extrinsically consequential. Once they are translated via electoral 
uncertainty into governments that begin to produce public policies, they will 
affect rates of economic growth, willingness to invest, competitiveness in 
foreign markets, distributions of income and wealth, access to education, 
perceptions of cultural deprivation, racial balance, and even national identity. 
To a certain extent, these substantive matters are anticipated by actors and 
incorporated in the compromises they make with regard to procedures, but 
there is lots of room for error and unintended consequence. In the short run, 
the consolidation of democracy depends on actors’ and citizens’ ability to 
come up with a solution to their intrinsic conflicts over rules; in the long run, 
it will depend upon the extrinsic impact that policies made under these 
rules will have upon groups within a (hopefully) civil society. 
4. Degree 
»Degree« implies that CS never completely monopolizes the interaction 
between individuals/firms and the state, but operates alongside such direct 
contacts and actions in differing mixes of efforts to influence the course of 
public policy. The more these efforts are channelled through intermediary 
organizations, the greater is the degree of civil society and, by implication, 
the easier it will be ceteris paribus to consolidate democracy. 
5. Distribution 
»Distribution« implies that the attributes of CS may be more applicable to 
some subsets of interests/passions rather than to others. Standard usage 
has focused on the intermediation of functionally-based lines of cleavage in 
society: classes, sectors and professions and the desirability that their 
particularly salient conflicts be processed through such channels, although 
as the bases of conflict shift within a given society, it may become equally 
imperative that »other« interests and even passions be represented in this 
fashion. 
(As the students in the Institute seminar reminded me, my emphasis 
on the »functional« domains of class, sector and profession tends to ignore 
both the issues and the forms of collective action associated with so-called 
»new social movements«. Despite its old-fashioned tone, I continue to 
believe – with James Madison and Karl Marx – that property and the 
organization of production provide the most enduring forms of cleavage and 
structuration in society and that, until and unless these are incorporated on 
a regular basis within the political system, it will be impossible to 
consolidate any type of democracy. I would readily concede, however, that 
the emergence of passionate causes rooted in gender, the environment, 
ethnic discrimination and/or national consciousness could make this task 
much more difficult and even overwhelm it). 
6. Type 
»Type« implies that the norms of autonomy, collective action, non-
usurpation and civility can be embodied in quite different ways to produce 
different general configurations or »systems of intermediation«. The most 
widely discussed of these has involved the ideal-typical distinction between 
pluralism and corporatism. The additional implication is that both of these 
configurations  
(as well as several intervening points on the continuum between them) are 
compatible with the CoD, but that their presence will have a significant 
impact upon the performance, distribution of benefits and »quality« of the 
democracy that emerges. 
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II.  
The existence of civil society is not a pre-requisite either for the 
demise of autocracy or for the transition to democracy. Rarely have 
actors in civil society alone brought about such a change in regime. 
1. The Resurrection of Civil Society 
However, the transition to democracy is almost invariably accompanied by a 
»resurrection of civil society« (even where none may have existed before). 
This usually occurs after not before the transition has begun. 
2. The Decline of Participation 
Much of the original impetus will take the form of relatively spontaneous 
movements, but with the convocation of elections during the transition 
attention tends to shift dramatically toward political parties. After the 
»founding elections«, however, as the polity settles into the trenches of 
more routinized conflict, the process of consolidation tends to bring out the 
role of interest associations.  
This can lead to a certain confusion about the nature of civil society in 
neo-democracies since there may be a temptation initially to identify its 
presence or strength by the spontaneity of social movements and the 
enthusiastic participation of citizens in them. This is bound to decline: 
(1) because the mere advent of democracy satisfies some of the most 
»passionate« revindications of movements;  
(2) because the process of consolidation encourages individuals and 
social collectivities to pursue more »private-regarding« interests and to 
»free-ride« on the efforts of others;  
(3) because the mechanisms of modern democracy tend to privilege 
territorially- and functionally-based interests (hence, political parties and 
interest associations) over thematically-based causes (i.e. »single-issue 
movements«). 
The important generality to keep in mind is that civil society is 
composed, not of a single type of intermediary organization, but of a variety 
of types of them, and that this mix should be expected to shift over time in 
response to changes in the substance and intensity of conflict, as well as 
the stage of democratization. 
III.  
The presence of a functioning party system (of whatever type) is not 
alone direct evidence for the existence of a civil society since 
political parties are not likely to be able to monopolize the 
organized intermediation between individuals/firms and public 
authorities.  
1. Changes in the Role of Parties 
No doubt, the functioning of a viable, competitive party system will benefit 
from the presence of a CS – for reasons explicated below – but such a 
system can hardly be expected to reflect all of its interests and passions, 
least of all, in the often lengthy period between elections. Parties will seek 
to penetrate and even to subordinate the core institutions of CS, i.e. its 
associations and movements, but there are several reasons to suspect that 
they have diminished considerably in their capability for aggregating its 
interests and passions through their programs, platforms and ideologies. 
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Very substantial changes have taken place in the nature and role of 
parties in well-established Western democracies. It would be anachronistic 
to presume that parties in today’s neo-democracies will have to go through 
all the stages and perform all the functions of their predecessors. Today’s 
citizens – even in polities that have long suffered under authoritarian rule 
and have no prior history of civil society – have quite different organizational 
skills, are less likely to identify so closely with partisan symbols or 
ideologies, and defend a much more variegated set of interests. Moreover, 
the new regimes are emerging in an international environment virtually 
saturated with different models of successful collective action. All this may 
not preclude a hegemonic role for parties in the representation of civil 
society, but it does suggest that they will be facing more competition from 
interest associations and social movements than their predecessors, and 
that we should revise our thinking about democratization accordingly. 
2. Channels of Representation 
Modern democracy is a very complex set of institutions involving multiple 
channels of representation and sites for authoritative decision-making. 
Citizenship, its most distinctive property, is not confined to voting 
periodically in elections. It also can be exercised by influencing the 
selection of candidates, joining associations or movements, petitioning 
authorities, engaging in »unconventional« protests, and so forth. Nor is the 
accountability of authorities only guaranteed through the traditional 
mechanisms of territorial constituency and legislative process. Much of it 
can circumvent these partisan mechanisms and focus directly through 
functional channels and bargaining processes on elected or appointed 
officials within the state apparatus. 
3. Partial Regimes 
For these reasons, modern democracy should be conceptualized, not as »a 
regime«, but as a composite of »partial regimes«, each of which has been 
institutionalized around distinctive sites for the representation of social 
groups and the resolution of their ensuing conflicts. Parties, associations, 
movements, localities and various clientele compete and coalesce through 
these different channels in efforts to capture office and influence policy. 
Authorities with different functions and at different levels of aggregation 
interact with these representative and could legitimately claim 
accountability to different citizen interests (and passions).  
Constitutions, of course, are an effort to establish a single, overarching 
set of »meta-rules« that would render these partial regimes coherent, by 
assigning specific tasks to each and enforcing some hierarchical relation 
among them, but such formal documents are rarely successful in 
delineating and controlling all these relations. The process of convoking a 
constituent assembly, producing an acceptable draft and ratifying it by vote 
and/or plebiscite, undoubtedly, represents a significant moment in 
democratic consolidation, but many partial regimes will be left undefined. 
For it is precisely in the interstices between different types of representation 
in civil society that constitutional norms are most vague and least 
prescriptive. Imagine trying to deduce from even the most detailed of 
constitutions (and they are becoming more detailed) how parties, 
associations and movements will interact to influence policies. Or trying to 
discern how capital and labor will bargain over income shares under the new 
meta-rules. 
If political democracy is not a regime but a composite of regimes, then 
the appropriate strategy for studying the relationship between its 
consolidation and civil society would be disaggregation. Not only is this 
theoretically desirable, but it also makes the effort more empirically 
feasible. In Figure One, I have attempted to sketch out the property space 
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would be involved and to suggest some of the specific partial regimes that 
are likely to emerge. On the vertical axis, the space is defined in terms of 
the institutional domain of action, ranging from authoritatively defined state 
agencies to self-constituted units of civil society. Horizontally, the variance 
concerns the power resources that actors can bring to bear on the emerging 
political process: numbers in the case of those 
9 Schmitter Some Propositions about Civil Society 
Figure One 
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relying primarily on the counting of individual votes; intensities for those that 
are based on weighing the contribution of particular groups of citizens. 
Competing theories of democracy: liberal-statist, majoritarian-
consociational, unitary-federal, presidential-parliamentary have long argued 
the merits of particular locations in Figure One. All are potentially 
democratic (provided they respect the overarching principle of citizenship 
and the procedural minima of civil rights, fair elections, free associability, 
etc.).  
4. The Over-representation of Dominant Interests 
In response to the opportunities (and threats) of democratization, individual 
associations are likely to have to change significantly in their internal 
structures and operative practices. Some will make every effort to retain the 
organizational advantages they enjoyed under the previous autocracy; 
others will seize upon the chance of establishing a new relationship with 
their members and inserting themselves independently into the policy 
process. Here, there is a deep-seated irony since those groups in CS that 
are in greatest need of collective action, i.e. those with numerous, 
dispersed and relatively impoverished individuals as potential members, are 
the least likely to be successful in attracting these members on a rational 
and voluntary basis. The small, concentrated and privileged groups should 
have less difficulty in generating resources under democratic conditions. 
Not only do they need them less (since their members may have adequate 
resources to act individually), but they were usually the privileged 
interlocutors and beneficiaries of the previous autocracy. Left to its own 
devices, then, the new »liberal« associability could produce a 
systematically skewed over-representation of dominant class, sectoral and 
professional interests. Subordinate groups have, of course, the new 
resource of voting between competing parties to pursue their general 
interests, but they may have to rely on the state recognition, licensing and 
subsidization characteristic of the ancien regime to participate effectively in 
the democratic game when it comes to advancing their more particular 
interests. The practical temptations of neo-corporatism, in other words, may 
outweigh the ideological attractions of pluralism. 
5. Direct Membership Organizations 
First, let us turn briefly to some properties of individual, direct membership 
organizations representing the interests of business, labor and agriculture 
that may change with the advent of democracy: 
(1) Number. Theoretically, this should be unlimited under the newly 
acquired twin freedoms of association and petition. As James Madison put 
it so bitterly about his fellow citizens, »the most frivolous and fanciful 
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and 
excite their most violent conflicts«. Indeed, his pluralist formula was 
designed to increase the potential number by multiplying the levels of 
authority around which they could form, as well as placing no barriers to 
their continual fragmentation. Several factors, however, may either raise the 
threshold of association formation for specific social groups, or restrict 
access to bargaining arenas by those that do manage to get organized. 
Here is where public policies, either held over from the previous regime or 
created anew under the new democratic regime, can be expected to play a 
crucial role. Linked to this basic condition are subsidiary questions of 
whether the associations are new or merely re-baptized versions of previous 
ones; whether their formation is spontaneous or sponsored (and, if so, by 
whom); and whether they tend to emerge early or late in the process of 
transition. 
(2) Member Density. According to liberal democratic theory, the 
proportion of those eligible to join and contribute to this form of collective 
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action who actually do so is supposed to be determined only by the rational 
and independent calculation of individuals. In fact, the usual social and 
economic »filtering mechanisms« are often supplemented by deliberate 
public and private actions. This leads to the murky area of outside 
sponsorship by political parties, statutory obligations by state agencies 
(vide chamber systems for capitalists and agriculturists, closed shops and 
union taxes for workers) and even more subtle forms of fiscal discrimination, 
licensing, export certification, subsidized services and outright coercion – 
all of which can bind various social and economic categories to their 
respective units of representation in ways they do not freely choose, but 
which have been accepted as compatible with democratic practice. 
(3) Representational Domain. According to the usual canons of 
democracy, interest associations (old or new) should be able to determine 
by themselves whom they wish to represent. They set the limits on whom 
they attempt to recruit as members and what they purport to speak for. 
Rarely, however, is this the case. Under state corporatist auspices – the 
usual inheritance from authoritarian rule – these domains were specified by 
law or administrative regulation. Interests had to be organized by economic 
sector or professional specialization; to have adopted a given territorial 
format; to have restricted themselves to a certain level of interaction; and to 
perform a prescribed set of tasks. Conversely, certain domains and 
activities were proscribed, as were specific political, ideological or cultural 
affiliations. These are organizational »habits« that may decay slowly, even 
when the original measures are revoked. 
6. The Definition of Interests 
Whatever the inheritance and the inertia, countries are likely to vary 
considerably in the way interest domains are defined. Two dimensions 
seem especially crucial for future democratic practice:  
(1) the degree of specialization into functional (e.g. product, sector or 
class), territorial (e.g. local, provincial or national) and task (e.g. trade vs. 
employer associations, unions oriented toward militant action vs. those 
oriented toward the provision of services) domains;  
(2) the extent of discrimination according to individual member 
characteristics such as size of firm, level of skills, public-private status, 
religious belief, ethnicity, party affiliation, etc.  
Summarizing this »bundle« of characteristics relative to individual 
associations, the two emergent properties that seem to make the most 
difference for the consolidation of different types of democracy could be 
called strategic capacity and encompassingness:  
(1) Are these newly created or recently renovated organizations 
sufficiently resourceful and autonomous to be able to define and sustain a 
course of action over the long-run that is neither linked exclusively to the 
immediate preferences of their members nor dependent upon the policies of 
parties and agencies external to their domain?  
(2) If this is the case, how broad a category of represented interests 
can be covered by any given organization or coordinated by peak 
associations through hierarchical arrangements?  
Where polities acquire class, sectoral or professional associations 
with both strategic capacity and encompassing scope, these units of civil 
society play a more significant role in the consolidation process than where 
a great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and overlapping organizations 
emerge with close dependencies upon their members and/or interlocutors. 
Pluralist associations, in other words, weaken the role of interest 
intermediaries; corporatist ones strengthen it. This difference also affects 
the probability of establishing stable partial regimes and, hence, the type of 
democratic regime. For example, the chance of creating viable concertation 
regimes linking associations directly with each other and/or to state 
agencies seems contingent on the development of strategic capacity and 
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encompassingness. Furthermore, once concertation is initiated, it will tend 
to encourage »participant associations« to acquire even more autonomy 
from members and party interlocutors and to extend their scope to bring 
wider and wider interest domains under their control. At the extreme, the 
neo-democracy could become populated with a series of »private interest 
governments« in sensitive policy areas, with profound consequences for 
political parties, local clienteles and the legislative process, as well as for 
the overall governability of the political order.  
7. Systems of Interest Intermediation 
The second set of emergent characteristics refers to what one may loosely 
term, the system of interest intermediation. The impact of organized 
interests in civil society upon the type of democracy cannot be assessed 
by merely adding together the associations and movements present in a 
given polity, but must also take into account the properties that emerge 
from their competitive and cooperative interaction. To keep the discussion 
focused, let us again concentrate on just the three most salient 
dimensions: 
(1) The first is coverage. What social groups are organized into wider 
networks of collective action, which operate strictly on their own, and which 
are completely left out? The usual decision to privilege class, sectoral and 
professional groups implies a biased assessment that these, among all the 
varied interests in CS, are likely to make the most crucial decisions with 
regard to partial regime consolidation and, eventually, the type of 
democracy. In the narrow sense, the issue is whether identifiable segments 
or factions of these interests (»potential groups« in the pluralist jargon) fail 
to organize – or do so to a degree appreciably lesser than would appear 
possible. Is this due to the persistence of repressive measures (e.g. 
prohibitions on the unionization of civil servants or the organization of 
shop-floor units of worker representation), to a strategic calculation that 
their interests would be better promoted/defended through other means of 
collective action (e.g. political parties, informal collusion or clientelistic 
connections), or to a structural incapacity to act under the new conditions 
of voluntarism and competitiveness? Granted that it may be difficult to 
assess counterfactually the presence of interest categories that »exist but 
do not act« and to reconstruct the logic that leads conscious and active 
groups to be satisfied through one mode rather than another of 
representation, but a comprehensive assessment of the coverage of 
emergent interest systems requires at least some effort in this direction – if 
only because of the hypothesis that democracies will face serious problems 
of legitimacy and governability if they exclude (or simply ignore) such 
potentially active social groups. 
The problem is exacerbated when one shifts from this narrow class 
and sectoral focus to the much broader question of the coverage of »other« 
interests (not to mention, passions), i.e. those people who are poor, aged, 
sick, unemployed, illiterate, dwelling in slums, foreigners deprived of decent 
treatment, natives suffering from ethnic, linguistic or sexual discrimination, 
anxious about environmental degradation, concerned about world peace or 
the rights of animals, e cosi via. Here, there can be no initial presumption 
that collective action will take the rather limited and specialized form of 
associability. Their demands may be better addressed via political parties (if 
they are voters), religious institutions (if they are believers), local 
governments (if they are spatially concentrated) or state agencies (if they 
are designated clients). They can also form their own social movements, 
with both an agenda and a means of action that may not be compatible with 
the more narrowly constrained scope of interest organizations. 
(2) The second emergent property is monopoly. The advent of 
democracy should encourage competition among groups in civil society for 
members, for resources and for recognition by, as well as access to, 
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authorities. It does not, however, make it imperative or unavoidable. The 
usual assumption is that the previous authoritarian regime – if it did not 
suppress associability altogether for specific groups – compelled them to 
act within a singular, monopolistic, state–recognized (and often state–
controlled) organization. Whether this situation persists after that regime 
has fallen seems to be contingent on political factors that assert 
themselves during the transition and that can have a lasting effect. By far 
the most salient, especially with regard to trade unions, is the emergent 
structure of competition among political parties. Rivalry between ideological 
»camps«: Communists, Socialists and, occasionally, Christian Democrats, 
over worker affiliation often antedates the demise of authoritarian rule, but it 
may be only after electoral politics has been restored that it can become 
sufficiently salient to split more–or–less unitary workers’ movements. 
Business and professional associations have historically been less 
organizationally affected by partisan divisions – even when their members 
voted for competing parties – but they have sometimes been fragmented by 
linguistic or religious differences. Far more divisive for them has been the 
conflict of interest between small, medium and large enterprises – 
analogous to the difficulties of containing white and blue collar workers 
within the same peak association or of working out »non–raiding 
agreements« between unions representing differing skill levels. Regionalism 
and »micro–nationalism« can also led to situations of competition for 
members or access – often under quite uncivil norms. 
Whatever the source, the emergent post-authoritarian system will 
possess varying degrees of »monopoly power« in the representation of 
interests – and this will be crucial for the formation of partial regimes. 
Oftentimes, this will prove difficult to assess for the simple reason that 
associations may appear to have defined their domains in ways that imply 
competition, while in practice coming to less obtrusive arrangements under 
which they agree not to try to lure away each other’s members, or to share 
key resources and even leaders, or to engage in a subtle division of labor 
vis–a–vis potential interlocutors. For example, capitalists in northern and 
central European countries are organized into separate hierarchies of trade 
and employer associations that seem to be competing for member 
allegiance and political access. Upon closer examination (and despite 
some past conflicts), this turns out to be a quite stable division of labor that 
lends considerable flexibility and »redundant capacity« to that class’ 
defense of its interests. 
(3) The third system property is coordination. Single associations tend 
to have a limited span of control and capacity for managing interest 
diversity. The age-old quest for »One Big Union« has gone unfulfilled for 
workers, although capitalists and farmers have sometimes come closer to 
that goal. In order to represent more comprehensive categories, the usual 
technique has been to create »associations of associations«. These peak 
organizations (Spitzenverbände is the incomparable German phrase) may 
attempt to coordinate the behavior of entities within a single sector (e.g. the 
entire chemical industry), a whole branch of production (e.g. all of industry) 
or the class as a whole (all capitalists, workers or farmers irrespective of 
branch or sector). They may cover a locality, a province or region, a national 
state or even a supranational unit such as the European Community. Their 
success in effectively incorporating all relevant groups and forging a unity of 
action among them also varies from very incomplete and loose confederal 
arrangements in which members retain their financial and political autonomy 
and are moved to common action only by exhortation or the personal 
authority of leaders, to highly centralized and hierarchic bodies with superior 
resources and even a capacity to discipline all class or sectoral interests 
that refuse to follow an agreed-upon policy line. 
The attainment of such a high coordinative capacity is not attained 
without struggle or, at least, never without significant threats to the interests 
at stake. This is obviously easier to do where the scope is purely local and 
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the sector quite narrow – for at these levels the mutual effects of small 
numbers and close social interaction can be brought to bear. To accomplish 
such feats on a national and class basis requires much greater effort. 
Normally, it comes only after the building blocks – the direct membership 
local and sectoral associations – have been created, but this tends to make 
the subsequent subordination of the latter more difficult. In some cases, the 
heritage of centralization from the immediately preceding state corporatist 
experience may facilitate such an outcome. 
8. Inter-organizational Systems 
If strategic capacity and encompassingness were the two composite, 
emergent properties of individual associations within civil society that 
seemed most relevant, the two that best define the nature of inter-
organizational systems of interest intermediation are class governance and 
congruence: 
(1) Class governance is the capacity to commit a comprehensive 
social category – e.g. all owners of productive property, workers in all 
industries, self-employed in all sectors – to a common and long-term 
course of action and to be able to assure that those bound by such a policy 
do indeed comply with it. Theoretically, this could be accomplished by a 
political party, although the logic of continuous electoral competition tends 
to undermine this for manual workers – and parties have almost never 
performed this function for capitalists. In practical and contemporary terms, 
if class governance is to become a property of civil society and the political 
order, it is a set of interest associations (or even a single peak association) 
that will have to do the job. 
(2) Congruence refers to the extent to which the coverage, monopoly 
status and coordinative capacity of one class, sector or profession within 
civil society are similar to others. One could postulate an underlying trend in 
this direction, especially between clusters of associations that represent 
conflicting interests. Nevertheless, in historical terms, some may take the 
lead in experimenting with (and, occasionally, borrowing from abroad) novel 
forms of self-organization that subsequently diffuse to their opponents or 
imitators. Given the high uncertainty of the transition period, incongruence 
would seem a rather normal state and the question would be whether this 
tends to diminish during the course of democratic consolidation. 
IV.  
The presence of civil society contributes to the consolidation of 
democracy through the several processes. Civil society, however,  
is not an unmitigated blessing for democracy. It can affect the 
consolidation and subsequent functioning of democracy in a number 
of negative ways.  
1. Positive Contributions 
The presence of civil society contributes to the consolidation of democracy 
through the following processes:  
(1) It stabilizes expectations within social groups and, thereby, 
presents authorities with more aggregated, reliable and actionable 
information with which to govern; 
(2) It inculcates conceptions of interest and norms of behavior that are 
civic, i.e. that are mindful of the existence of the unit as a whole and 
respectful of the democratic process; 
(3) It provides channels for self-expression and identification that are 
more proximate to individuals and firms and, hence, less alienating to use 
when making demands, especially upon remote central-national officials; 
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(4) It serves to govern the behavior of its members with regard to 
collective commitments, thereby, reducing the burden of governance for 
both public authorities and private producers; 
(5) It provides important, but not unique, reservoirs of potential 
resistance to arbitrary or tyrannical action by rulers – whether by illegitimate 
usurpers or intolerant majorities. 
2. Negative Effects 
Civil society, is not an unmitigated blessing for democracy. It can affect the 
consolidation and subsequent functioning of democracy in a number of 
negative ways: 
(1) It can make the formation of majorities more difficult, lengthy and 
precarious, thereby, lowering the legitimacy of democratic governments; 
(2) It may build into the policy process a systematically biased 
distribution of influence, especially where its formative principles are strictly 
liberal, i.e. individualistic and voluntaristic. (As one North American critic – 
E. E. Schattschneider – put it: the problem with the interest group chorus in 
the United States is that it sings in an upperclass accent); 
(3) It tends to impose an elaborate and obscure process of 
compromise upon political life, the outcome of which can be policies which 
no one wanted in the first place and with which no one can subsequently 
identify; 
(4) It can reinforce the tendency toward »pork-barrel« solutions 
whereby each association or movement satisfies its interests/passions at 
the expense of the unit as a whole with the end result being an inefficient 
and inflation-prone economy; 
(5) Most dangerously, »it« may prove to be not one but several civil 
societies – all occupying the same territory and polity, but organizing 
interests and passions into communities that are ethnically, linguistically or 
culturally distinct – even exclusive. (The historic solution in Western Europe 
to this »pillarization« of CS has been consociationalism or Proporz-
demokratie, but this may not be an option for most neo-democracies which 
might, therefore, have to face the difficult prospect of secession).  
Any given civil society will produce a mixture of the effects noted 
above. Nothing a priori guarantees that the positive ones will outweigh the 
negative ones, although that has been the European experience over the 
long run. (Many authors – and, most prominently, Jürgen Habermas – have 
presumed that the mere presence of a civil society would ensure the 
existence of a »public space« within which matters of concern to the polity 
as a whole will be debated openly and binding agreements be reached 
consensually. For the negative reasons sketched above, I am skeptical of 
this assumption. Everything will depend on the individual and systemic 
properties of the associations and movements that emerge. If they are small 
enough in number, encompassing in their domains, balanced in their 
capabilities, capable of governing their members’ behavior and congruent in 
their configurations, then, there may be a greater chance that they will 
contribute to promoting a »social dialogue« inside or outside such public 
institutions as the parliament. If not, they may just [re]produce a set of 
squabbling, self-interested organizations which are individually and 
collectively incapable of agreeing upon a common course of action and the 
so-called »public interest« will only be the mechanical vector of their 
conflicting demands. Unfortunately, most actors in contemporary neo-
democracies are likely to be affected by short-term and egoistic 
calculations under conditions of high uncertainty and, hence, are unlikely to 
be able to see – much less to agree upon – the long-term desirability of 
constructing a distinctive public space.) 
If the above conceptualization of the problem has any validity, it should 
be possible to assess the probable outcome by monitoring the properties 
for strategic capacity, encompassingness, class governance and 
 16 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 10 
congruence that emerge during the process of regime change. These, in 
turn, depend on the more discrete characteristics that individual 
associations and movements are acquiring, i.e. their numbers, densities of 
membership and domains of representation, as well as upon the emergent 
macro-characteristics of the system of intermediation: its coverage of 
interests/passions, its extent of monopoly and its degree of coordination. 
V.  
The civil society is not an automatic or unreflexive product of 
capitalism, urbanization, literacy, social mobilization, empathy –  
i.e. of development – although it is encouraged by all of the above. 
Rather, its emergence requires explicit policies by public authorities 
and implicit practices by private (re)producers.  
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1. Rights and Obligations 
The public policies involve a complex mix of rights and obligations which 
have varied considerably historically and, hence, are difficult to generalize 
about. They include such things as: 
(1) freedom of association, petition and assembly; 
(2) legal recognition and immunity; 
(3) special fiscal treatment; 
(4) established arenas for functional representation; 
(5) guarantees of access to decision-making; 
(6) protection from non-intromission in internal affairs; 
(7) subsidization with public funds; 
(8) obligatory membership and/or contributions;  
(9) legal extension of contracts (Allgemeinverbindlichkeit); 
(10) devolved responsibility for policy implementation. 
2. Private Practices 
The private practices that have contributed to greater reliance upon the 
intermediaries of civil society are even more difficult to pin down, although 
they would include the following: 
(1) class, sectoral, professional or group consciousness; 
(2) willingness to contribute to collective action; 
(3) ‘moral sentiments’ or self-restraint in the pursuit of group interests; 
(4) satisfaction derived from interacting with one’s peers, i.e. 
sociability; 
(5) trust in group leadership and in the conformity of one’s peers; 
(6) some degree of ’other-regardingness’ for the society as a whole; 
(7) propensity to accept group discipline; 
(8) willingness to forego opportunities for special access due to 
personal attributes, i.e. resistance to clientelistic temptations; 
(9) sense of personal efficacy; 
(10) command over sufficient organizational skills. 
VI.  
The emergence of civil society can assume a wide variety of 
systemic configurations, although the range that is viable in a given 
polity is likely to be considerably more restricted. 
1. As we have noted in Proposition I, variations in type – especially along 
the continuum from pluralism to corporatism – can be expected to produce 
significant differences in the distribution of benefits, the aggregate economic 
performance and the governability of the democracy that may eventually 
emerge.  
2. Especially significant for understanding these differences are the two 
summary properties of individual associations or movements: strategic 
capacity and encompassingness, and the two summary properties of the 
systems of intermediation: class governance and congruence. The higher 
the values on these four dimensions – and they tend to be higher in more 
corporatist as opposed more pluralist systems – the greater will be the 
positive contribution of civil society to the consolidation of democracy. 
3. Which is not to say that it is easy to predict or understand why a given 
polity will adopt one or another configuration. One obvious factor is likely to 
be the legacy of institutions from the previous autocracy and the extent to 
which the mode of transition ensures some degree of continuity. Pacted 
transitions from ancien regimes with well-entrenched state corporatist 
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practices may provide the most favorable context; whereas, abrupt or violent 
changes from personal autocracies based on patrimonial or clientelistic 
relations (»sultanistic« is the term that Juan Linz has proposed to cover 
such cases – even if this may do some violence to the relatively orderly and 
bureaucratic rule of the Ottoman Empire) would seem to be the least likely 
context for the emergence of anything but a very weak civil society. 
4. Many other factors, no doubt, conspire in the background to incline 
emergent civil societies toward one or another configuration. High levels of 
pre-industrial urbanization, catholicism, small size of country, delayed but 
relatively rapid capitalist development, conservative political coalitions 
overseeing the Great Transformation, persistence of artisanal modes of 
production, policies of agricultural protectionism and, especially, strength of 
Social Democracy have all been associated with more corporatist outcomes 
in Western Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries, although it is 
by no means clear whether these variables still pack the same punch, or 
even push in the same direction. 
5. What is relatively new and potentially highly significant is the emergence 
of something approaching an »transnational civil society«. These networks 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), most of which are 
headquartered in established civil societies, and funded and staffed by their 
citizens, have created a rather formidable capacity for intervening in neo-
democracies. Each successive case of democratization since 1974 has 
contributed more to the development of formal non–governmental 
organizations and informal informational networks devoted to the promotion 
of human rights, protection of minorities, monitoring of elections, provision of 
economic advice, fostering of exchanges among academics and 
intellectuals. When the first cases of Portugal, Greece and Spain emerged, 
this sort of infrastructure hardly existed. Indeed, some of the key lessons 
were learned from these experiences and subsequently applied elsewhere. 
By now, there exist an extraordinary variety of transnational parties, 
associations, foundations, movements and networks ready to intervene 
either to promote or to protect democracy. To the extent that the 
international context promoting the consolidation of democracy has shifted 
from its habitual primary reliance on public, intergovernmental channels of 
influence towards an increased direct involvement of private, non-
governmental organizations, it can help to foster the development of national 
civil societies where they might not otherwise have emerged or where they 
might have been absorbed by either public authorities or private 
(re)producers.  
VII.  
While its historical origins are unequivocally rooted in Western  
Europe, the norms and practices of civil society are relevant to the 
consolidation of democracy in all cultural and geographical areas of 
the world, provided that the generic type of democracy that actors  
are seeking to consolidate is modern and liberal, i.e. constitutional, 
representative, accountable via pluri-party competitive elections, 
tolerant of social/ethnic diversity and respectful of property rights.  
1. Whether by imperial fiat, the actions of resident European  colonists 
or processes of international diffusion, the norms and practices of civil 
society have spread beyond the core area in which they were first 
developed. Admittedly, this has been an uneven process and it has been 
superimposed upon quite different »native« traditions. Some extra-European 
societies may have had analogous institutions in the past, viz the guild 
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systems of ancient China or the Ottoman Empire, but it is debatable 
whether such legacies have any contemporary relevance.  
2. Whether there exist other generic forms of democracy that are viable and 
better reflect the cultural norms and popular expectations of particular 
national societies is a matter for discussion, although I would like to 
interject a personal note of skepticism. Not only has this notion of a more 
»authentic« African, Asian (»Confucian«), Latin American (»Iberian«) or just 
plain Non-Western democracy repeatedly been used as a coverup for 
autocratic practices, but it has rarely been accompanied by any evidence 
that citizens in the specific society in question actually possessed such 
distinctive values or political cultures that would require them to hold their 
rulers accountable in some different fashion. 
